Round Table: Liverpool FC v West Brom 0-0 – It's a numbers game

Posted by PhaseOfPlay on December 15, 2017, 05:45:12 am

So another draw, another 90 minutes or so of frustration, and another controversial referee decision that has us all arguing about what's right, what's wrong, and whether there is an international conspiracy of referees and assorted officials that want to be an eternal spoke in the LFC wheel. As much as these points are pertinent to varying degrees, it doesn't hide the fact that yet again we've dominated a game and come away with a kick in the bollocks. But it's not a two-game streak that we will hopefully play our way out of. It's actually becoming a trend. And the unfortunate thing is that it is probably happening because of all the good things Jurgen Klopp is bringing to Liverpool.

The Numbers

We had 70% possession against West Brom. That's Guardiola levels of possessing the ball. We had 75% against Everton. Those are numbers that would have the football journalisti (I've made up that word) creaming themselves if it were Barcelona. But we have nothing to show for it except a bloody nose and four points down the drain – four points we badly need. These weren't two draws gained from a valiant effort in the rearguard against wave after wave of attack. They are draws where Liverpool had so much of the ball both West Brom and Everton were practically demanding to take our throw-ins just so they could remember what it was like to have the ball at all. But was the possession effective possession?

Well, for a start, the most passes were played by Dejan Lovren. The second-most passes were jointly held by Klavan and Coutinho. Robertson had more passes than Firmino, more than Mane, and more than Salah, and more than any two of those combined. Lovren had more passes than all three together. So we had 70% possession, but we had it in the wrong areas. This is partly because West Brom were positioned in a compact defensive shell that they were looking to break from. But also because we're very good at actually keeping the ball. But herein lies the problem.

You can't Geg without Pressing, and you can't press when you have the ball

Klopp has said “No play-maker in the world can be as good as a good counter-pressing situation.” This is the basis of his entire philosophy, the cornerstone of his entire success, and the single tactical principle that informs his training, strategy, team selection and transfer preferences. It makes sense – teams are most vulnerable immediately after gaining possession, as they try to build position in order to develop their own attacks. The central point of any type of counter-pressing game is that winning the ball back early, and high up the pitch, will create attacking gaps that can be exploited by all nearest players to the ball, which will negate the need for any one player to be a play-maker It has high technical, physical and mental demands, but contrary to what seems to be popular opinion, it is not something that requires hours of tactical work to figure out – although it does require a lot of repetition to make sure players learn to not switch off, because the logical conclusion of counter-pressing is that if your opponent is most vulnerable immediately after winning possession, then so too would the counter-pressing team, on their own attacking transitions. So lots of mental reaction, physical endurance training, and tactical repetition is the order of the day.

A short digression

What is the difference between all of these terms? They sometimes get used interchangeably, by pundits, journos, bloggers, and supporters alike. But are they all the same?

The answer is no. There are levels of sophistication involved, and levels of player involvement. Some parts of it are absolutely required in every defensive phase, while others are tactical and strategic choices made by the coaches and players.

Firstly, there is “Pressure”. “Pressure” is basically the first principle of defending – the nearest defensive player closes down the attacker with the ball, and from there has a choice of three actions – tackle for the ball, contain them to prevent forward passing and movement, or jockey them to a predesignated area of the field as a trigger to their fellow defenders to get a compact shape and prepare to intercept and mark the opposition attackers. Defending under Rodgers was almost entirely based on this principle – the nearest defender pressured the attacker, if he got beat, the next nearest defender stepped in and pressured, if he got beat, the next nearest again, etc. It's easy to see how a domino effect could happen in these situations, which is rather much how we conceded a lot of goals under Rodgers

Secondly, there is “Pressing”. This is the coordinated movement of defensive players to reduce the space the opposition have to play in, and to knock them off their own playing rhythm. The idea is to win the ball back as early as possible. After that, the options vary. The Irish team under Jack Charlton were masters of it, making sure that the opposition spent more time facing their own goal than they would have liked to. Guardiola's Barcelona made sure the opposition didn't have the ball for more than 6 seconds if possible. But where both teams diverged is what happened when they won the ball – for Ireland, it was a big, lofted ball into the “mixer”; for Barca, it was possession, resting on the ball, and getting players into position in order to play combinations or free Messi up to create chances.

Lastly, there is counter-pressing, or Gegenpressing in the German vernacular. This is much like “Pressing”, but the final objective is different. The object of counter-pressing is to use the moment of transition as a means to score goals in gaps created by the opposition moving wide and long to create attacking options for themselves, which in turn creates large spaces for quick, one-touch football to be played directly to goal. It is much the same as how a counter-puncher fights in a boxing match – using the opponent's own attacking actions and momentum against themselves by hitting them in the gaps they create by trying to launch their own attacks.

The "Fatal Flaw" of Gegenpressing

The problem with Gegenpressing is a simple one – in order to counter-PRESS, the other team has to actually launch an attack. And to launch an attack, they have to actually have the ball (or if they do have it, they need to want to use it constructively). Some teams have twigged this, and have instead developed their entire game-plan around not having the ball (much like Inter did under Mourinho against Barca in 2010). That means a lot of long balls over the top, a lot of clearances, and hoping for the best. But that also means a lot of possession for the counter-pressing team. Other teams (like West Brom), will clear the ball, but will also try to attack with 2-3 players only, not committing any back players forward if they can help it. The result of this is usually a few attacks, that are quickly snuffed out. Which, again, means the counter-pressing team have a lot of the ball.

We've seen this from a number of games under Klopp. Any time we've had 65% or more in a game, we've failed to win an average of 65% of the time (the matching number is purely coincidental!). So in those games, we've absolutely dominated the ball, and have failed to win  2 out of every 3 games. This makes sense – we're a team trained and designed (for a large part) to press, press, press, and attack, rinse and repeat. But we can't press if we have the ball. And if we have the ball 2/3's of the game, it limits our counter-pressing opportunities, which means that any team who understand this, will know they only have to keep their discipline and shape, not get too unhappy with seeing little of the ball, and make sure any mistakes they make in possession are made in the Liverpool half of the pitch, without committing numbers forward.

For a team to have the ball for 65% or more of the game (and we've gone as high as 80% - the Burnley game last year that we lost 2-0), they should be looking at a handy win. But teams who seek out that kind of high possession (a Rodgers team, for example), they would want to have a high number of play-making, creative players in the attack, and they would want to be focusing their physical tactics on positioning with the ball.

But a team built on counter-pressing can't play with those kinds of attacking players, if they don't also bring enormous physical effort. A team built on counter-pressing doesn't really want to have 65/70/80% of the ball. It would actually work out better if the other team had that kind of possession (unless the opposition is Manchester City under Pep Guardiola, and ref comes from Keystone Kops-R-Us). Possession in football matches is never really 50/50. It's usually 55% to 45% in favour of one team. A team getting between 55-64% possession is probably a passing team who like to build moves, but who aren't averse to the occasional punt forward.

A team with 65% or more, though, really needs a lot of creativity on the ball in the attack, otherwise the possession can (and often does) become sterile – defence to midfield, back to defence, back to midfield, switch left, switch right, teasing ball into the attack, safe pass back out into midfield, back to defence, back to the keeper, and start all over again. This is not conducive to scoring a lot of goals. With this amount of possession, the ball really needs to be  kept in the attacking third and just before it, like Barca used to do, or City under Pellegrini. It creates a dilemma for a manager like Klopp – should he persist with the ideas, and hope to recruit quicker-playing, more creative attackers to catch up to the possession and make it fruitful? Or should he change the game-plan so that possession is more of the focus than counter-pressing? Striking a balance between the two is a tough act. We couldn't do it against West Brom. We couldn't do it against Everton. Or a number of teams since October 2015. If more teams twig to that vulnerability of the Klopp plan, will that force Jurgen to change completely, or will he find that minor adaptation that turns a coaches stalling ideas into a fresh new plan that revives the team's way of winning? It remains to be seen. But West Brom – straight after Everton – showed that there is a wrinkle in the fabric of the Kloppification of the team. A wrinkle that – if ironed out – will put the tactical variety of the team on another level.

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